Abstract
Introduction
The mathematical theory of games was introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 [10] . A core idea of game theory is how strategic interactions between rational agents (players) generate outcomes according to the players' preferences [7] , [11] . Game theory thus forms a suitable framework to obtain more insight into the interactions of self-interested agents with potentially conflicting interests. A player in a non-cooperative game responds to the actions of other players by choosing a strategy (from its strategy space) in an attempt to maximize a utility function that quantifies its level of satisfaction.
In a cellular system each user desires to have a high SIR at the base station (BS) coupled with the lowest possible transmit power. It is important in such systems to have high SIR, as this will reflect a low error rate, a more reliable system, and high channel capacity, so that more users can be served per cell. It is also important to decrease the transmit power to lengthen battery life and to alleviate the nearfar problem. In power control algorithms exploiting game theory however, the tendency of each user to maximize its utility function in response to other users' actions, leads to a sequence of power vectors that converges to a point where no user has incentive to individually increase its power. This operating point is called a NE Point. Due to the lack of cooperation between the users this point may not be efficient, in the sense that it may not be the most desirable social point [1] . In Pareto sense, the most desirable point is actually the power vector that Pareto dominates all other power vectors.
The power control problem for wireless data CDMA systems was first addressed in the game theoretic framework in [2] , [1] , then in [5] , [6] . In this paper the work in [1] , which only dealt with deterministic (nonfading) channels, is studied in a realistic wireless CDMA channels by considering the following two fading models: Nakagami fast flat fading and Nakagami slow flat fading channel models. Here we derive a closed-form expression of the average of the utility function proposed in [1] . We then evaluate the performance of their proposed game-theoretic algorithms through the existence, uniqueness and social desirability of NE operating point under the assumed channel models.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the utility function and the system model studied in this paper. In Section 3 we evaluate the performance of the system for the channel models mentioned above. Non-cooperative power control game (NPG) and Non-cooperative power control game with pricing (NPGP) are discussed briefly in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We then point out the constraints on the new modified strategy spaces to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of NE points for NPG and NPGP under the assumed channel models in Section 6. Simulation results are outlined in Section 7, and our conclusions are given in Section 8.
Utility function and system model
In general utility functions are used to quantify the satisfaction level a player achieves by choosing an action from its strategy profile, given the other players' actions. A utility function thus maps the player's preferences onto the real line. A formal definition of a utility function may be found in [7] In a CDMA cellular system, a number of users sharing the spectrum and air interface. Henceforth, each user's transmission adds to the interference of all users at the BS. Each user desires to achieve a high quality of reception at the BS, i.e., a high SIR, while using the minimum possible amount of power in order to extend the battery's life. The conflicting goal of each user to have a high SIR at the BS makes the game theoretic framework suitable for studying and solving the problem.
In this paper we consider the same system model and the same utility function of [1] : Single-cell direct sequence code division multiple access (DS-CDMA) system with N users, where each user transmits frames (packets) of M bits with L information bits. The rate of transmission is R bits/sec for all users. Let P c represent the average probability of correct reception of a frame at the BS, and let p represent the average transmit power level. The utility function for a CDMA system is given by:
where f (γ) is an efficiency function that approximates P c . Thus, u represents the number of information bits successfully received at the BS per joule of expanded energy. With the assumption of no error correction, and correct packet reception rateP c , i.e., P c = E{P c }, is then given by M l=1 (1 −P e (l)), whereP e (l) is the bit error rate (BER) of the lth bit at a given SIR γ i . P e is the average BER, that is P e = E{P e } (c. f. (15)). It should be noted that the efficiency function f (γ) has the same expression of P c in terms ofP e , except thatP e is replaced by 2P e (see [1] for more details).
Evaluation of the performance
In this Section we derive a closed-form formulas of the average utility functions under Nakagami fast/slow channel models. The derived formulas are then used to study the existence and uniqueness of NE point in Section 6.
The SIR of the ith user (γ i ) at the BS is assumed to be large (γ i 1) to combat the fading effect, it is given by [9] :
Where α i is the path fading coefficient between ith user and the BS and is constant for each bit in a fast flat fading channels (a1), while it is constant for each packet in a slow flat fading channels (a2). W is the spread spectrum bandwidth, p k is the transmitted power of the kth user, h k is the path gain between the BS and the kth user, and σ 2 is the variance of the AWGN (additive-white-gaussian-noise) representing the background thermal noise in the receiver. For simplicity we express the interference from all other users as x i , i.e.
therefore (2) can be written as:
For a given α i and x i , the BER,P (e|α i , x i ), of the ith user using BFSK is given by [9] :
The average BER and average utility functions for this modulation scheme is evaluated next under the previously mentioned channel models.
Nakagami flat fading channel
Here, the fading coefficient α i is modelled as a Nakagami random variable with a probability distribution given by [9] : f αi (ω) = 
E{(α
is a measure of the severity of the fading channel, where m = ∞ corresponds to a nonfading channel. In the following it is assumed that Ω = 1. Then the distribution of γ i for fixed x i is given as:
Nakagami fast flat fading channel
We find the conditioned error probabilityP (e|x i ) as:
For fixed m and γ i 1, (6) can be rewritten as:
To find the average P e , we need to find the mean of
Here, x i is a summation of independent random variables each distributed according to a Gamma density function. This makes the evaluation of (x i + σ 2 ) m tedious and it may be easier to find an approximate density function of x i . To do this, let us recall Esseen's inequality which estimates the deviation of the exact distribution of a sum of independent variables from the normal distribution [12] .
It is fairly simple to find out that the third moment
For large N , L N has a very small value, i.e., L N << 1. Examining (8) for small values of z, L N takes care of the bound and making it very small, while for large values of z, the exponential will decrease the bound and make it approach zero. In conclusion, we can approximate x i as a Gaussian random variable with mean ζ xi and variance σ 2 xi given by:
and
where (10) was obtained using the fact that α k and α l are statistically independent for all k = l. So, we can write f xi , the PDF of x i , as follows:
where w ≥ 0 and
is the error function. By examining equations (9) and (10), one can see that ζ xi σ xi , therefore δ i ≈ 1. Averaging (7) over f xi (ω) we obtain the average error probability P e for high SIR below:
where we used the change of variable y = x i + σ 2 and the last approximation in (11) used the fact that σ 2 1. By examining (11) one can see that it is the mth moment of a random variable y normally distributed with mean ζ y = ζ xi + σ 2 and variance σ 2 y = σ 2 xi . Therefore, the average P e is given by:
where γ i is the ratio of the mean of the received power from user i to the mean of the interference at the receiver and given by:
and C k is the kth central moment and it is given by [9] :
By splitting up the summation in (12), we obtain:
x (see (10) ) is very small compared to ζ xi (see (9)), we can approximate the summation by its leading term which is 1. Therefore the average P e at high SIR behaves like:
And the average utility function of the ith user is given by:
Nakagami slow flat fading channel
u i (p|x i ) can be determined as follows:
By factorizing (1 − e −γi/2 ) M and using the identity
a n+1 we obtain:
For fixed m and high SIR, γ i 1 (18) can be approximated as:
Averaging (19) with respect to the distribution of x i and using the same argument as in (11), (12) and (14) we end up with the final approximate averaged utility function given by:
where
In the following two sections, we introduce briefly both NPG and NPGP games.
Non-cooperative power control game (NPG)
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be the index set of the users currently served in the cell and {P j } j∈N represent the set of strategy spaces of all users in the cell. Let G = [N , {P j }, {u j (.)}] denote a noncooperative game, where each user, based on local information, chooses a power level from a convex set P j = [p j−min , p j−max ] and where p j−min and p j−max are the minimum and the maximum power levels in the jth user strategy space, respectively. Assuming that the power vector p = [p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p N ] is the result of NPG, the utility of user j is given by [1] :
where p j is the power of user j, and p −j is the vector of powers transmitted by all other users. The right side of (21) emphasizes the fact that user j can only control his own power. We rewrite (1) for user j as:
The formal expression for the NPG is given in [1] as:
This game will produce a sequence of power vectors until it converges to an NE operating point where all users are satisfied with their utility level. Unfortunately, NE point of NPG is not efficient in most cases. In order to reach Pareto dominant NE point, a pricing technique was introduced in [1] . The resulted game is called non-cooperative power control game with pricing (NPGP) and it is described briefly in the next Section.
NPGP
In NPGP each user maximizes the difference between its utility function and a pricing function. This aims to allow more efficient use of the system resources within the cell, as each user is made aware of the cost of aggressive usage of resources, and of the harm done to other users in the cell. We use here a linear pricing function, i.e., a pricing factor multiplied by the transmit power. The base station broadcasts the pricing factor to help the users currently in the cell reach a NE that improves the aggregate utilities of all users at power levels lower than those of the pure NPG. In other words, the resulting power vector of NPGP is Pareto dominant compared to the resulting power vector of NPG, but is still not Pareto optimal.
Let 
where c is a positive number chosen to get the best possible improvement in the performance. Therefore, NPGP with a linear pricing function can be expressed as:
Existence and uniqueness of NE point
In this Section we show that NPG and NPGP introduced by [1] admit a unique NE points under the assumed channel models. However, to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the NE point in both games, the terminals' strategy spaces defined in [1] should be constrained more. That is, some transmit power values which were allowed in a nonfading channel, may not be allowed under a fading channel. In the following, we refer to the unconstrained maximizing transmit power level of user i by p max i . P i refers to the convex strategy space of user i. 
Lemma 1 In NPG under Nakagami fast flat fading channel with the average utility function u i given in (16) with m = 2, the existence of a NE point is guaranteed if the strategy space is modified to the following convex set
is a standard interference function, therefore by [8] NE point is unique.
Proof 1 In all following proofs we make use of the classical results of game theory, where the existence of a NE point is guaranteed if the utility function is quasiconcave and optimized on a convex strategy space. Thus, to prove the existence of NE point, it is enough to prove that the utility function u i is concave (a concave function on some set is also a quasiconcave function on the same set) in p i given p −i on the convex set P
i = {p i : γ i ∈ γ i−min , γ i−max }.
Let us find the first and second order derivatives of u i in (16) after setting m = 2 with respect to p i as follows:
and this implies that
where γ i−min = 8(2 + 5M ) − 8 M (8 + 17M ) and 
while
It is clear that δp
is a standard interference function, and the NE point is unique.
In the following lemmas we omit the proof of existence and/or uniqueness as they are similar to those of lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 In NPG under Nakagami slow flat fading channel with the average utility function u i given in (20), a NE point is guaranteed if and only if the strategy space is the following convex set P
As a result, the convex strategy space should be P i = {p i : γ i ∈ 1, √ 6 ξ } to guarantee the strict concavity of u i and then the existence of a NE point is guaranteed. Now, we turn to the existence and uniqueness of NE point of NPGP under the assumed channel models discussed above. 
(30) is a standard interference function, therefore by [8] NE point is unique. 
Proof 3 The maximizer transmit power p
The only feasible solution of the equation above is given by (30). 
Lemma 4 In NPGP under
Proof 4 The maximizer transmit power level p max i
is the feasible solution of the following equation. Next, we introduce the algorithms that converges to Nash equilibria points of NPG and NPGP. We need to keep in mind that the strategy space denoted by P i in the algorithm differs according to the channel model. The algorithm is the same as in [1] except that the strategy spaces are modified to the forms given in lemmas 1-2 to guarantee the existence of NE point under the studied channel models.
The only feasible solution of the equation above is as given by (32). It is simple to check that
Assume user j updates its power level at time instances that belong to a set T j , where T j = {t j 1 , t j 2 , · · · }, with t j k < t j k+1 and t j 0 = 0 for all j ∈ N. Let T = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · } where T = T 1 T 2 · · · T N with t k < t k+1 and define p to be the smallest power vector in the modified strategy space P = P 1 P 2 · · · P N . 
Algorithm 1 Consider non-cooperative game G as given in (23) and generate a sequence of power vectors as follows: (a) Set the power vector at time
t = 0: p(0) = p, let k = 1 (b) For all j ∈ N , such that t k ∈ T j : Given p(t k−1 ), calculate p max j (t k ) = arg max p j ∈ P j u j (p j , p −j (t k−1 )) (c) If p(t k ) = p(t k
Simulation results
We show the effects of time-varying, fast and slow Nakagami fading wireless channels on the equilibrium utilities and powers of NPG and NPGP proposed in [1] .
The system under study is a single-cell DS-CDMA cellular mobile system with 9 stationary users, all are using the same data rate R = 10 4 bps and the same modulation scheme (non-coherent BFSK). The system parameters used in this study are given in Table 1 2 , users do not reach a NE point. Where all users except the nearest user to the BS are using the highest power level in the strategy space without achieving the maximizing SIRs. Fig.1 demonstrates the equilibrium utilities and the equilibrium powers of NPG under a fast fading channels (a1) with spreading gain W/R = 10 3 . All users were able to achieve their maximizing SIR under Nakagami channels. The equilibrium utilities and equilibrium powers of the NPGP under (a1) are shown in the left and right graphs of Fig.2 , respectively. Results show that a Pareto improvement over NPG in Nakagami channels was obtained such that all users succeeded to attain SIRs more than their corresponding NPG SIRs. Fig. 3 presents the effect of the Nakagami slow flat fading channels (a2) on the equilibrium utilities and powers. This figure shows that, unlike fast fading channels, all users succeeded to achieve the maximizing SIR γ max i = √ 3ξ = 25.1182. As for the effect of slow fading channels on the outcomes of NPGP, equilibrium utilities and equilibrium powers, the simulations results showed that Pareto improvement (dominance) over NPG was not possible under Nakagami small scale models. At c = c Best , simulation results showed that the best policy for all users is to target a fixed SIR, that is γ max i = 25.1182, which is exactly the same situation as in NPG. To demonstrate this result more clearly, we present 
Conclusions
We studied a noncooperative power control game (NPG) and noncooperative power control game with pricing (NPGP) introduced in [1] under realistic channel models. We studied the impact of power statistical variation in Nakagami fast/slow flat fading channels on the powers and utilities vectors at equilibrium. The results showed that an equilibrium with an equal maximizing SIR is not attainable in both games with spreading gain (W/R = 10 2 ). In fast fading with spreading gain W/R = 10 3 , fixed target SIR NPG admitted NE point only under Nakagami small scale models. Results demonstrated that in Nakagami slow flat fading channels, NPGP with linear pricing does not exhibit a Pareto dominance over NPG outcomes at equilibrium. 
